The Undeserved Legacy of Charles XII: Historiographical Failings in Military History
‘Battle of Poltava’, Pierre-Denis Martin, 1726, oil on canvas (size unknown)
Charles XII of Sweden, who pulled the country into the disastrous Great Northern War at the age of only eighteen, is the epitome of this problem. Charles won a long string of battles that in theory are exceptionally impressive when all factors other than simple troop numbers are ignored. An image has been formed of the great Carolus Rex who defeated army after army of larger Polish or Russian forces, triumphing through his tactical brilliance, his men’s belief in him and (depending on whether you’re a far-right activist) the inherent superiority of Swedes over the Slavic Poles and Russians. Charles has always been at the core of the Swedish far-right, from pro-Nazi movements during the war comparing his defeats of Russia to Hitler’s, to modern Facebook meme pages (namely “Swedish Imperial Memes) whose content combines their glorification of Charles and his campaigns with extreme anti-refugee and anti-Semitic content. Much of this is tied to three historical myths around Charles: 1. That he personally was responsible for the quality of the Swedish army, 2. That Russia and (especially) Poland maintained powerful armies that it was impressive to defeat, and finally 3. That he personally was a master of strategy and tactics.
In terms of the first, the quality of the Swedish military must be seen in the context of the Scanian war, where Sweden was ultimately defeated under Charles XI by Denmark and its allies. Following this defeat, Charles XI established a firmer professional standing army, sent officers to study abroad to improve the officer corps and increasingly adopted modern tactics. This then established the disciplined, well-led and modern army that Charles XII was then fortunate enough to command. Whilst Charles XII, the boy king who led his soldiers from the front, was certainly an inspirational figurehead for the army, it was not his achievement but his father’s.
In terms of the second, another powerful myth which has similarly been championed by the far-right feeds into this – the idea of Polish military dominance in the last seventeenth century, created by the role of Polish “winged hussars” in breaking the Ottoman Siege of Vienna in 1683. However, by the Great Northern War the majority of the Polish army was ill-equipped, technologically behind in an era where well-drilled musket troops and artillery dominated the battlefield, and most importantly poorly-motivated due to dynastic problems creating division and unclear legitimacy for the various Polish monarchs in this period. Similarly, the Russian army at the beginning of the war was ill-equipped, poorly-drilled and consisted of illiterate serfs called up to fight very far away from their homes and families that quickly crumbled to pressure. It is no surprise that the professional army constructed by Charles XI excelled particularly well against such forces. Further, it should be added that one of the most important changes between Russia’s early humiliations and later successes such as Poltava was the rebuilding and restructuring of the Russian army along Western European lines, and thus when the Swedish army was confronted with a more equivalent force it collapsed, no matter Charles’ grand strategy.
‘Karl XII and Ivan Mazepa after The Poltava Battle 1709’, Gustaf Cederström, 1880s, Oil on Canvas (size unknown)
Finally, Charles’ reputation as a tactical and strategic genius personally responsible for bringing Sweden victory time and time again is similarly undeserved. Across his battles, his tactics rarely vary from overconfident, direct and decisive frontal attacks which, when commanding his professional and disciplined army against inferior foes unsurprisingly worked, yet was insufficient against the more equivalent later Russian army. Secondly, his grand strategy for winning the war can very easily be placed into question – although that being said retrospective criticism of a general’s broader strategy is always easy to find. The strategic criticisms of Charles can be summarised simply by describing him as far too overconfident, whether it was in leaving Russia alone for many years while he was on his Polish adventure, giving them time to restructure their army, attacking Russia whilst lack supplies and lying to his commanders about their destination or massively overestimating Cossack support. His decisive and easy early victories seem to have never allowed him to develop a proper mind for strategy or tactics.
To round off, as much as Charles XII is an interesting historical figure, with fun quotes like “I have resolved never to start an unjust war but never to end a legitimate one except by defeating my enemies,” he certainly is no titan of military achievement. The military history of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century is fascinating as it represents polities moving towards the professional, artillery-reliant armies that would come to define the next two centuries of warfare. The Great Northern War is particularly interesting as part of this trend, as it represents a newly-reformed Swedish army proving the worth of these innovations on the battlefield, and Russia ultimately participating in a huge restructuring of their military forces to catch up. To simplify this to “Charles XII was a great general” not only unfairly represents this period, but it also gives the far-right a figure to rally around.
Written By: David Rowley
Bibliography
- Kuehn, John. “Popular Versus Scholarly Military History.” Humanities and Social Sciences Online. Jan 30, 2016.Accessed March 5, 2020. https://networks.h-net.org/node/12840/blog/109917/popular-versus-scholarly-military-history
- Lisk, Jill. The struggle for supremacy in the Baltic, 1600–1725. London: University of London Publishing, 1968.
- Lunde, Henrik. A Warrior Dynasty: The Rise and Decline of Sweden as a Military Superpower. Philadelphia: Casemate Publishing, 2014.
- Miller, William. “Getting a Fix on Violence.” In Humiliation: and other essays on honour, social discomfort, and violence. Edited by William Miller. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993: 53-92.
- Morgan, Rebecca. “The anatomy of a far-right idol: Karl XII of Sweden.” Medium. Oct 16, 2019.
- Accessed March 5, 2020. https://medium.com/@rebeccajanemorgan/the-anatomy-of-a-far-right-idol-karl-xii-of-sweden-6d82fa36fb63
- Proyect, Louis. “How Stieg Larsson Exposed the Swedish Far Right.” Counterpunch. Sept 19, 2014. Accessed March 5, 2020. https://www.counterpunch.org/2014/09/19/how-stieg-larsson-exposed-the-swedish-far-right/
- Upton, Anthony F. Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism, 1660–1697. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Weigley, Russell F.. The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004.
Nazis? Far-right? A Facebook meme page? You can’t even give due or correct criticism towards a historical figure without making it about your complete and utter obsession with modern left vs right politics. I had to double-check to make sure I wasn’t on a page for a different University of York, perhaps one based in the US. You could write an entire book on criticisms of Charles XII of Sweden, but what you came up with is that someone that runs a meme page on Facebook is anti-refugee and anti-Semitic and likes Charles XII, therefore Charles XII “like sucks and was never even any good anyway” (you may as well have just written this).
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I agree with the premise that the Swedish army didn’t owe its success to Charles’ supposed strategic or tactical prowess.
But your article goes to extreme lengths to say, essentially, that the Swedish army was equal or inferior to standard European armies during this time. That it collapsed when facing a more equal Russian army, no matter Charles strategy, is especially egregious – the Swedish army performed exceptionally well during most engagements with Russia up until Poltava – where the colossal strategic failure of invading Russia played a major part.
You succesfully paint this picture by neglecting to mention the part the Saxon army played in this conflict. All major engagements in Poland-Lithuania was against primarily the Saxon army – Düna, Kliszow, and Fraustadt – Fraustadt being the most decisive and impressive victory, against the Saxon army exclusively. Look up the reputation the Saxon army had at the time – it was a far cry from the less proffessional armies of Russia or Poland-Lithuania.
I have some other gripes with this article, for instance that Charles supposedly pulled the country into the Great Northern War when he was one of only two monarchs in Sweden’s great power period who in fact did not start any war – don’t you understand that phrasing it this way hurts your credibility? Or is it an invitation for people to engage with you, and disagree? Have I been tricked to engage with you? Then let me tell you – that was a great hook.
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While no doubt well-researched, I’m not sure about your conclusions that you’ve drawn here.
Firstly, the Great Northern War was only disastrous for Sweden because it lost. That may sound stupidly obvious but it’s important. The choices presented to the young Charles XII were war to protect his empire and all the power and prestige that came with it or submit to foreign domination at the hands of primarily Poland and Russia. In that context – and in the wider context of war being a perfectly legitimate foreign policy tool that you are no doubt aware of – war is the reasonable choice. If Sweden had won outright or Charles had decided to engage in negotiations and accept favourable peace terms then the Great Northern War would have been a smashing success for him and Sweden and thus not disastrous. But, in conclusion, that is not to say that the war itself was disastrous simply because Charles chose not to sue for peace, as I just laid out. I hope I haven’t misunderstood the point there, otherwise I’d have made a whole argument for nothing!
How prevalent is the myth that Charles XII was himself responsible for the quality of his army? I ask from a place of ignorance, I simply don’t know. But it occurs to me that – while the extent of his responsibility may well be a myth – to say that Charles XII was simply “fortunate enough” to lead the army that his father built detracts from the impact that he personally had. Sure, he came to be in his position through an accident of birth, but if he’d grown up to be useless then it wouldn’t matter how good the Swedish army was after Charles XI’s reforms because their king wouldn’t have been able to use it. His personal qualities surely add to the capabilities of the army that he inherited, making him ultimately responsible for its quality by virtue of his abilities and political position as absolute monarch? I think disagreeing with that would be like saying Alexander the Great and Frederick the Great don’t deserve their epithets because the armies that gave them their victories and empires were products of the reforms of their respective fathers.
I do understand what you’re saying regarding your second point about the quality of the Polish and Russian forces that Charles XII came up against. The creation of an enemy as being impossibly strong but also beatable is central to far-right ideologies. But is that really a historiographical failing or simply far-right movements being full of people that can’t understand history properly? Just would be nice to see where the historiographical failings are because, as far as I can tell, well-researched history shows Polish and Russian forces as mostly dysfunctional and ineffective in the early period of the War, that’s all.
I do agree with you that considering Charles XII a tactical or strategic genius is a bit of a stretch. To me, he simply wasn’t around long enough to make that kind of assessment. However, I think there’s definitely at least a conversation to be had about his potential for genius. Failures of assumption, overconfidence, and underestimation of certain factors are common amongst generals but are only misplaced when they keep on losing, except he kept on winning. He’d reformed Sweden’s taxation system to better fund the war effort, placed greater emphasis on drilled volley fire and the socket bayonet than his father’s reforms had done, and also made effective tactical use of cavalry at a time when many were thinking that shock cavalry was on its way out of modern European warfare. He gambled based on informed understandings and it often worked and I think it’s a bit unfair to dismiss him from the ‘genius’ conversation just because he ended up losing.
The main issue I have is that I’m not seeing how any of this is to do with historiographical failings. The far-right can’t do history or any sort of reasonable critical assessment of anything, it’s not in its nature. Do you really think that that’s the fault of the historiography?
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